On de-bunking “Fake News” in the post-truth era : how to reduce statistical error in research by Flyvbjerg, B. et al.
This is a repository copy of On de-bunking “Fake News” in the post-truth era : how to 
reduce statistical error in research.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/149782/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Flyvbjerg, B., Ansar, A., Budzier, A. et al. (10 more authors) (2019) On de-bunking “Fake 
News” in the post-truth era : how to reduce statistical error in research. Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 126. pp. 409-411. ISSN 0965-8564 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2019.06.011
Article available under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-ND licence 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
On De-bunking "Fake News" in the Post-Truth Era: 
How to Reduce Statistical Error in Research* 
 
Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, in press,  
published online at http://bit.ly/2Jwqsy8 
 
By Bent Flyvbjerg,1 Atif Ansar,2 Alexander Budzier,3 S¿ren Buhl,4 Chantal Cantarelli,5 Massimo 
Garbuio,6 Carsten Glenting,7 Mette Skamris Holm,8 Dan Lovallo,9 Eric Molin,10 Arne R¿nnest,11 
Allison Stewart,12 Bert van Wee13 
 
 
Abstract: The authors note with alarm that statistical noise caused by statistical incompetence is 
beginning to creep into research on cost overrun in public investment projects, contaminating research 
with work that does not meet basic standards of validity and reliability. The paper gives examples of 
such work and proposes three heuristics to root out the problem. First, researchers who are not 
statisticians, or do not have a strong background in statistics, should abstain from doing statistical 
analysis, and instead rely on more experienced colleagues, preferably professional statisticians. Second, 
journal referees should clearly state their level of statistical proficiency to journal editors, so these can 
set the right referee team. Finally, journal editors should make sure that at least one referee is capable 
of reviewing the statistical and methodological aspects of a paper. The work under review would have 
benefitted from observing these simple heuristics, as would any work based on statistical analysis. 
 
 
The editors of Transportation Research Part A recently received a comment by Peter Love, Lavagnon Ika 
and Dominic Ahiaga-Dagbui (2019) as a rejoinder to our critique (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018) of a paper by 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018). However, as the rejoinder came in the form of a new paper, the editors 
kindly offered us the possibility of a re-rejoinder, which follows below.  
 
One Error Covertly Corrected, 13 Overtly Ignored 
In Flyvbjerg et al. (2018: 177-78, tables 1 and 2) we rejected four postulated myths, one by one, and 
identified 14 serious statistical errors in the earlier paper by Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018). Two 
mathematical statisticians helped us identify the mistakes. If we are right about these errors, then the 
conclusions of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui are statistically invalid. If we are wrong, then we would expect 
them to point out where and argue why, as is common in academic discourse, so that the best validity 
claims may gain preference and the discourse move to a higher, more informed level. Instead, Love et 
al. (2019) stay silent and neglect their academic obligation to address our critique. We take this to mean 
that they cannot counter it. 
 
We are happy to note, however, that by their actions if not by their words, Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui 
admit to our critique and have taken it to heart, at least in one instance. On page 23 of the accepted 
manuscript of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018) they wrote: 
 
"At a minimum, an estimate [of cost] for a large infrastructure project should include the 
estimated uncertainty measured by the relative standard deviationÓ (our emphasis). 
 
In a short forerunner to Flyvbjerg et al. (2018), invited by the editor of Local Transport Today,14 Flyvbjerg 
identified the above statement as a statistical error: 
 
                                                   
* We would like to dedicate this comment to the memory of our colleague Daniel Lunn, who was Professor of 
Statistics at the University of Oxford. Lunn co-authored our first comment (Flyvbjerg et al. 2018) and would 
have been on the team for the present follow-up had he not died suddenly in February 2019. We missed him in 
preparing this note and will miss him going forward. 
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"Distributions of cost overrun for large infrastructure projects are asymmetrical and fat-
tailed ... For such distributions the standard deviation is not a good measure of uncertainty. The 
standard deviation ignores fat tails and gives the impression that distributions are 
symmetric, i.e. that overruns and underruns around the central value are equally likely, 
which is emphatically not the case for large infrastructure projectsÓ (Flyvbjerg 2018a: 3, 
emphasis added). 
 
Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui evidently read Flyvbjerg's critique, which was printed before the final 
publication of their manuscript, and took it to heart, because in their published paper the following 
words from their accepted manuscript had mysteriously disappeared:  
 
"measured by the relative standard deviation,Ó 
 
changing their final text to read instead: 
 
"At a minimum, an estimate for a large infrastructure project should include 
the estimated range of uncertaintyÓ (Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018: page 366). 
 
We see the change from accepted to published manuscript as direct acknowledgment from Love and 
Ahiaga-Dagbui that we were right about their error regarding the standard deviation. However, they 
do not verbally acknowledge this anywhere. We believe the academic debate would benefit from them 
explaining why they made the change, and why their original approach to measuring uncertainty is 
faulty. Other scholars would then be able to learn from the mistake and not repeat it, which is the way 
the academy is supposed to work. We further suggest that after having corrected the first error, the 
scholarly thing to do would have been for Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui to address each of the remaining 13 
errors, like we addressed each of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui's points of critique in Flyvbjerg et al. (2018). 
 
Instead of furthering academic argument in this well-tried manner, Love et al. (2019) choose to present 
a simple repetition of what they already said in Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018). We responded to this 
in Flyvbjerg et al. (2018) and therefore see no reason to repeat ourselves here. Love et al. also introduce 
an additional topic, not covered in Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui (2018), namely a repeat of a critique by 
Lavagnon Ika (2018), whom Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui have recruited as co-author. However, Ika's 
critique was also addressed previously, in Flyvbjerg (2018b), and will therefore be considered only briefly 
here. 
 
Garbage In, Garbage Out 
Love and his colleagues make much of a so-called replication of Flyvbjerg's (2016) test of HirschmanÕs 
theory of the Hiding Hand, which Ika claims to have carried out based on a study of project performance 
in a sample of 161 projects15. Even if we assumed that the replication was valid, it would not be a 
replication of the original study with the same type of data and methodology, and therefore the original 
study would remain valid. However, the replication is not valid for the following reasons. 
 
First, Ika's study is based on recalled, perceived project performance as subjectively reported by project 
supervisors on a simple seven-point scale. Flyvbjerg (2016), and most other academic studies in this field, 
are based on observed, actual project performance, measured by the difference between estimated and 
actual costs and benefits, recorded consistently across projects following standards first systematized by 
Pickrell (1989) for the U.S. Department for Transportation and today followed by academics, 
governments, and national audit offices around the world. 
 
To compare recalled, subjectively perceived performance with observed, actual performance, as Ika 
does, is likely to entail error. For instance, behavioral science has shown that people, including experts, 
generally perceive and remember outcomes as more positive than they actually are or were (Gilovich et 
al. 2002). This is part of optimism bias and is likely to have influenced the results of Ika's analysis. People 
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also intentionally and unintentionally misrepresent their answers in surveys and interviews to conform 
to what is perceived to be socially desirable, which leads to underreporting of undesirable failure 
(Krosnick 1999). Such optimism and misrepresentation would explain the striking difference between 
Ika's results and the rest of the field, and why Ika's results are utterly at odds with the findings of 
behavioral science. Given this background, it is surprising, and disconcerting, that Ika would rely on his 
subjective data without any reflection on the important and well-documented sources of error and bias 
this entails, and what they mean to his conclusions. 
 
Second, and worse, Ika's methodology seems manipulated, deliberately or not, to produce support for 
the Hiding Hand. When purporting to measure success and failure, Ika divides his seven-point scale into 
two separate sections, with 1-3 (three choices) signifying project failure and 4-7 (four choices) signifying 
project success. With this division, even if responses were distributed randomly across the seven-point 
scale, the outcome would be a strong bias for concluding that projects are successes on average, which 
Ð conveniently for Love et al. Ð happens to support the Hiding Hand. This outcome is not a characteristic 
of the projects Ika studied, but a result of the biased methodology that he designed for the study, which 
would have amplified well-known response biases (social desirability bias, acquiescence bias) that again 
would have led to underreporting of failure and overreporting of success. It is difficult to believe that 
Love et al. would not be aware of these self-made biases and how they affect their conclusions. But 
nowhere do they warn readers against the biases, which makes the analysis highly suspect. 
 
In sum, due to these errors and biases, Ika's so-called "data" Ð and the "findings" built on them Ð are 
methodological artifacts that say little about reality and much about a relaxed attitude to validity and 
truth that has no place in scholarship. No matter how many averages, standard deviations, and technical 
tables are computed on the basis of such wanting data, the results will be garbage-in-garbage-out. Ika's 
work unfortunately is as statistically inadequate as that of Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui. For the full 
argument regarding Ika (2018) we refer to Flyvbjerg (2018b). 
 
How to Get More Signal and Less Noise in Research 
We would like to end by asking, at a more general level, how statistical errors like those committed by 
Peter Love and his colleagues  may be reduced in research. Gigerenzer (2004), Taleb (2007), and others 
(McGregor 1993, Leek et al. 2017, Gelman 2018) have long argued that statistical incompetence is a 
problem in research on human affairs, and that such research therefore often produces spurious results, 
sometimes with negative consequences for policy and practice. It is crucial for any academic field, 
including transportation research and project management, to root out such incompetence. If this does 
not happen, it will become increasingly difficult to distinguish between signal and noise in research 
results, which will undermine the value of research and trust in it. We note with alarm that statistical 
noise is beginning to creep into research on cost overrun due to work like that of Love and his colleagues, 
who are not alone, to be fair, as we show in Flyvbjerg et al. (2018). 
 
Researchers, referees, and editors alike have key roles to play in ensuring that statistically misleading 
results do not get published. We suggest the following simple heuristics as a first step to improve the 
statistical quality of published research: 
 
1.! If you're not a statistician, or don't have a strong background in statistical analysis, don't do statistical analyses16. 
Or if you do, make sure to obtain quality assurance by a statistician. Having taken a few statistics 
courses and knowing how to run a statistical package on your computer is not enough. You 
would never allow your ear doctor to operate on your eyes. Similarly, you should not allow non-
statisticians, including yourself, to do your statistical analyses. The most important skill of 
researchers regarding statistical analyses is to realize they are not statisticians. If you're a teacher, 
instill this attitude in your students. 
 
2.! If you're a journal referee, clearly state your level of statistical proficiency to the editors. If you do not have the 
statistical expertise to review a paper, let the editors know so they can ensure that one of your 
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fellow referees does17. Do not go light on the review of statistical analyses on the assumption that 
one of the other referees will do the work (unless you know for sure that is the case). Do not 
assume that the statistical analyses are probably okay, because often they are not. 
 
3.! If you're a journal editor, make sure that at least one referee is capable of reviewing the statistical and 
methodological aspects of a paper. 
 
We maintain that Peter Love and colleagues would have been well served by observing these heuristics, 
and by engaging in proper academic debate about their many statistical errors, which now hang over 
their work as a damaging and unresolved issue. 
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